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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the synergies between a GNSS
Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system
and a novel Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Sense-
and-Avoid (SAA) architecture for cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. The integration of ABIA with
SAA has the potential to provide an integrity-
augmented SAA solution that will allow the safe and
unrestricted access of UAS to commercial airspace.
The candidate SAA system uses Forward-Looking
Sensors (FLS) for the non-cooperative case and
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
for the cooperative case. In the non-cooperative
scenario, the system employs navigation-based image
stabilization with image morphology operations and a
multi-branch Viterbi filter for obstacle detection, which
allows heading estimation. It utilizes a Track-to-Track
(T3) algorithm for data fusion that allows combining
data from different tracks obtained with FLS and/or
ADS-B depending on the scenario. Successively, it
utilizes an Interacting Multiple Model (IMM) algorithm
to estimate the state vector allowing a prediction of the
intruder trajectory over a specified time horizon. Both
in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, the risk of
collision is evaluated by setting a threshold on the
Probability Density Function (PDF) of a Near Mid-Air
Collision (NMAC) event over the separation area. So,
if the specified threshold is exceeded, an avoidance
manoeuvre is performed based on a heading-based
Differential Geometry (DG) algorithm and optimized
utilizing a cost function with minimum time constraints
and fuel penalty. In addition, the optimised avoidance
trajectory considers the constraints imposed by the
ABIA in terms of GNSS constellation satellite elevation
angles, preventing degradation or losses of navigation
data during the whole SAA loop. This integration
scheme allows real-time trajectory corrections to re-
establish the Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
when actual GNSS accuracy degradations and/or data
losses take place (e.g., due to aircraft-satellite relative
geometry, GNSS receiver tracking, interference,
jamming or other external factors). Various simulation
case studies were accomplished to evaluate the
performance of the Integrity-Augmented SAA (IAS)
architecture. The selected host platform is the
AEROSONDE Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and
the simulation cases address a variety of cooperative
and non-cooperative scenarios in a representative cross-
section of the AEROSONDE operational flight
envelope. The simulation results show that the IAS
architecture is an excellent candidate to perform high-
integrity Collision Detection and Resolution (CD&R)
utilizing GNSS as the primary means of navigation,
providing solid foundation for future research and
developments in this domain.
1. INTRODUCTION
In addition to Space Based Augmentation Systems
(SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation Systems
(GBAS), Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
augmentation can also take the form of additional
information being provided by other avionics systems.
In most cases, the additional avionics systems operate
via separate principles than the GNSS and, therefore,
are not subject to the same sources of error or
interference. A system such as this is referred to as an
Avionics-Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation
System (ABAS). GBAS and SBAS address all four
cornerstones of GNSS performance augmentation,
namely: accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity.
The ABAS approach is particularly well suited to
increase the levels of integrity and accuracy (as well as
continuity in multi-sensor data fusion architectures) of
GNSS in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
aviation applications. In Unmanned Aerial System
(UAS) applications, airworthiness requirements for both
cooperative and non-cooperative Sense-and-Avoid
(SAA) impose stringent GNSS data integrity
requirements. Therefore, a properly designed and
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation
(ABIA) capability would allow an extended spectrum of
autonomous and safety-critical operations by
continuously monitoring GNSS integrity levels and
providing suitable caution and warning signals to the
remote pilot or to the avionics flight control systems in
order to accomplish GNSS-based mission and safety-
critical tasks. This increased level of integrity could
provide a pathway to support the unrestricted access of
UAS to commercial airspace. Although current and
likely future SBAS/GBAS augmentation systems can
provide significant improvement of GNSS navigation
performance, a properly designed and flight certified
ABAS/ABIA system could play a key role in GNSS
integrity augmentation for aviation safety-critical
applications, including UAS SAA. Furthermore, using
suitable data link and data processing technologies on
the ground, a certified ABAS capability could be a core
element of a future GNSS Space-Ground-Avionics
Augmentation Network (SGAAN).
2. ABIA SYSTEM RESEARCH
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated the
potential of this technology to enhance GNSS integrity
performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
applications including experimental flight test/flight
inspection, precision approach and automatic landing
[1-5]. Therefore, an advanced ABIA system was
developed for UAS applications (Fig. 1). In this
system, the on-board sensors provide information on the
aircraft relevant flight parameters (navigation data,
engine settings, etc.) to an Integrity Flag Generator
(IFG), which is also connected to the GNSS system.
Using the available data on GNSS and the relevant
aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals are generated
which can be sent to the UAV Ground Control Station
(GCS) or used by a Flight Path Optimisation Module
(FPOM). This system addresses both the predictive and
reactive nature of GNSS integrity augmentation by
producing suitable integrity flags (cautions and
warnings) in case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data
losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding
the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified
for each phase of flight, and providing guidance
information to the remote pilot/autopilot to avoid
further data losses/degradations.
Fig. 1. ABIA system architecture for UAS applications.
To achieve this, the Integrity Flag Generator (IFG)
module produces the following integrity flags [1-3]:
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the
avionics system is going to exceed the RNP
thresholds specified for the current and planned
flight operational tasks (GNSS alert status).
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive
annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the
avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds
specified for the current flight operational task
(GNSS fault status).
The following definitions of Time-to-Alert (TTA) are
applicable to the ABIA system [1-3]:
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time
allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the
user before the onset of a GNSS fault resulting in an
unsafe condition.
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum
time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault
resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the
moment that the ABIA system provides a warning
flag to the user.
2.1 ABIA Integrity Flag Generator
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal
losses in aviation applications were deeply analysed in
[1] and are listed below:
 Antenna obscuration (i.e., obstructions from the
wings, fuselage or empennage during maneuvers);
 Adverse satellite geometry, resulting in high
Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP);
 Fading, resulting in reduced carrier to noise ratios
(C/N0);
 Doppler shift, impacting signal tracking and
acquisition/reacquisition time;
 Multipath effects, leading to a reduced C/N0 and to
range/phase errors;
 Interference and jamming.
Understanding the physics of these phenomena and
developing reliable mathematical models was essential
in order to properly design the ABIA IFG module [1].
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of the IFG module and its
interfaces.
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Fig. 2. ABIA IFG module architecture.
The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF and
WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with the
specified TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant
flight phases). IFG module inputs are from the GNSS
receiver and other aircraft sensors. The GNSS and
Sensors Layer (GSL) passes the aircraft Position,
Velocity, Time (PVT) and attitude (Euler angles) data
(from the on board Inertial Navigation Systems, Air
Data Computer, etc.), GNSS data (raw measurements
and PVT) and the Flight Control System (FCS)
actuators data to the Data Extraction Layer (DEL). At
this stage, the required Navigation and Flight Dynamics
(NFD) and GNSS Constellation Data (GCD) are
extracted, together with the relevant information from
an aircraft Three-Dimensional Model (3DM) and from a
Terrain and Objects Database (TOD). The 3DM
database is a detailed geometric model of the aircraft
built in a Computer Aided Three-dimensional
Interactive Application (CATIA). The TOD uses a
Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) and
additional man-made objects data to obtain a detailed
map of the surfaces neighbouring the aircraft. In the
Integrity Processing Layer (IPL), the Doppler Analysis
Module (DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by
processing the NFD and GCD inputs. The Multipath
Analysis Module (MAM) processes the 3DM, TOD,
GNSS Constellation Module (GCM) and A/C
Navigation/Dynamics Module (ADM) inputs to
determine multipath contributions from the aircraft
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to
the aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM)
receives inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS, and
computes the GNSS antenna obscuration matrices
corresponding to the various aircraft manoeuvres. The
Signal Analysis Module (SAM) calculates the link
budget of the direct GNSS signals received by the
aircraft in the presence of atmospheric propagation
disturbances (C/N0), as well as the applicable radio
frequency interference and Jamming-to-Signal ratio
(J/S) levels. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set
of predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger
the generation of both caution and warning flags
associated with antenna obscuration, Doppler shift,
multipath, carrier, interference and satellite geometry
degradations. The approach adopted to set-up thresholds
for the ABIA CIF and WIF integrity flags is depicted in
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Integrity flag thresholds.
The masking integrity flag criteria are the following:
 When the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead to
less the 4 satellite in view, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF
shall be generated.
Additionally, when only four satellites are in view:
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle
(antenna frame) is less than 10 degrees, the caution
integrity flag shall be generated.
 When one (or more) satellite(s) elevation angle is
less than 5 degrees, the warning integrity flag shall
be generated.
From the definition of Dilution of Precision (DOP)
factors, GNSS accuracy can be expressed by [6]:
σ୔ = DOP × σ୙୉ୖ୉ (1)
where σ୔ is the standard deviation of the positioning
accuracy and σ୙୉ୖ୉ is the standard deviation of the
satellite pseudorange measurement error. For the C/A-
code σ୙୉ୖ୉ is in the order of 33.3m. Therefore, the 1-
sigma Estimated Position, Horizontal and Vertical
Errors of a GNSS receiver can be calculated using the
PDOP (EPE in 3D), the HDOP (EHE in 2D) or the
VDOP (EVE). In order to generate CIFs and WIFs that
are consistent with current GNSS RNP, we need to
introduce the Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy
(HA/VA) requirements in the various flight phases.
The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the radius of a
circle in the horizontal plane, with its centre being at the
true position, which describes the region which is
required to contain the indicated horizontal position
with the required probability for a particular navigation
mode. Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half
the length of a segment on the vertical axis, with its
centre being at the true position, which describes the
region which is required to contain the indicated vertical
position with the required probability for a particular
navigation mode. As a result of our discussion, the
DOP integrity flags criteria are the following:
 When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA
95% alert requirements, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System
(GLS) has to be augmented by GBAS in order to
achieve the RNP, as well as Lateral and Vertical
Protection Levels (LPL and VPL). LPL/VPL is defined
as the statistical error value that bounds the
Lateral/Vertical Navigation System Error (NSE) with a
specified level of confidence. In particular, for the case
of Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), which
allows for multiple Differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS) reference receivers (up to four) to be
implemented, two different hypotheses are made
regarding the presence of errors in the measurements.
These hypotheses are:
H0 Hypothesis – No faults are present in the range
measurements (includes both the signal and the receiver
measurements) used in the ground station to compute
the differential corrections;
H1 Hypothesis – A fault is present in one or more range
measurements and is caused by one of the reference
receivers used in the ground station.
Consequently, LPL and VPL are computed as follows:LPL = MAX {ܲܮ ܮு଴, ܲܮ ܮுଵ} (2)VPL = MAX {ܸܲܮு଴,ܸܲܮுଵ} (3)
VPL and LPL for the H0 and H1 hypotheses are
calculated as described in [16]. The lateral and vertical
accuracy (NSE 95%) and alert limits required by a GLS
in the presence of LAAS, considering the continuously
varying position of the aircraft with respect to the
Landing Threshold Point (LTP) are given in [7].
Additionally, [7] provides the so-called Continuity of
Protection Levels in terms of Predicted Lateral and
Vertical Protection Levels (PLPL and PVPL).
Although the definition in [7] is quite comprehensive, a
generic statement is made that the PVPL and PLPL
computations shall be based on the ranging sources
expected to be available for the duration of the approach.
In other terms, it is implied that the airborne subsystem
shall determine which ranging sources are expected to
be available, including the ground subsystem’s
declaration of satellite differential correction
availability (satellite setting information). Unfortunately,
this generic definition does not address the various
conditions for satellite signal losses associated to
specific aircraft manoeuvres (including curved GLS
precision approaches). Therefore, it is suggested that an
extended definition of PLPL and PVPL is developed
taking into account the continuously varying aircraft-
satellite relative geometry (masking envelope). In
particular, when the current aircraft manoeuvre will lead
to less than 4 satellites in view or unacceptable accuracy
degradations, the CIF shall be generated. Following our
discussion, the additional integrity flags criteria adopted
for GLS in the presence of LAAS are the following:
 When the PLPL exceeds LAL or PVPL exceeds
the VAL, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the LPL exceeds the LAL or the VPL
exceeds the VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-
Late Phase (ELP) observable and the range error [8].
As described in [2], the multipath integrity flags criteria
are the following:
 When the ELP exceeds 0.1 radians, the caution
integrity flag shall be generated.
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter,
the warning integrity flag shall be generated.
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated
with Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis of
the GNSS receiver tracking performance was required.
When the GNSS measurement errors exceed certain
thresholds, the receiver loses lock to the satellites. Since
both the code and carrier tracking loops are nonlinear,
especially near the threshold regions, only Monte Carlo
simulations of the GNSS receiver in different dynamics
and SNR conditions can determine the receiver tracking
performance [6, 9, 10]. Nevertheless, some
conservative rule of thumbs that approximate the
measurement errors of the GNSS tracking loops can be
used. Numerous sources of measurement errors affect
the Phase Lock Loop (PLL) and the Frequency Lock
Loop (FLL). However, for our purposes, it is sufficient
to analyze the dominant error sources in each type of
tracking loop. Considering a typical GNSS receivers
employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator, the
PLL threshold is given by [6]:
3σ୔୐୐ = 3σ୨+ θୣ ≤ 45
° (4)
where:
σ୨ = 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except
dynamic stress error;
θୣ = dynamic stress error in the PLL tracking loop.
Frequency jitter due to thermal noise and dynamic stress
error are the main errors in a GNSS receiver FLL. The
receiver tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter
must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency pull-in
range of the FLL discriminator. Therefore, the FLL
tracking threshold is [6]:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3σ୲୊୐୐ + fୣ ≤ 1/4T (Hz) (5)
where:
3σ୊୐୐ = 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter;
σtFLL= dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop.
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-
of-thumb for the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracking
threshold is that the 3-sigma value of the jitter due to all
sources of loop stress must not exceed the correlator
spacing (d), expressed in chips. Therefore [6]:
3σୈ୐୐ = 3σ୲ୈ୐୐ + Rୣ ≤ d (chips) (6)
where:
σ୲ୈ୐୐ = 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter;
Re = dynamic stress error in the DLL.
The Phase Lock Loop (PLL), FLL and DLL error
models described in [2] allow determining the C/N଴
corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds. The
integrity flag criterion applicable to the ABIA system is:
ቀ
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where:(C/N଴)୔୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for PLL tracking;(C/N଴)୊୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for FLL tracking;(C/N଴)ୈ୐୐= Minimum C/N଴ for DLL tracking.
Numerical solutions of Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) show that
the weak link in unaided avionics GNSS receivers is the
carrier tracking loop threshold (greater sensitivity to
dynamics stress). Therefore, the (C/N଴)୔୐୐ threshold
can be adopted in these cases. In general, when the
PLL loop order is made higher, there is an improvement
in dynamic stress performance. Therefore, third order
PLL are widely adopted in avionics GNSS receivers.
Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20
msec predetection integration time (typical values for
avionics receivers), the rule-of-thumb tracking threshold
for the PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz. Additionally, in
aided avionics receiver applications, the PLL tracking
threshold can be significantly reduced by using external
velocity aiding in the carrier tracking loop. With this
provision, a tracking threshold of approximately 15 to
18 dB-Hz can be achieved. Using these theoretical and
experimental threshold values, we can also calculate the
receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the
various cases of practical interest, as described in [1].
When available, flight test data collected in
representative portions of the aircraft operational flight
envelope (or the results of Monte Carlo simulation)
shall be used. Taking an additional 5% margin on the
3-sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following
additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA integrity
thresholds:
 When either 42.25° ≤ 3σ୔୐୐ ≤ 45° or 0.2375T ≤
3σ୊୐୐ ≤ 0.25T or 0.05d ≤ 3σୈ୐୐ ≤ d, the CIF
shall be generated.
 When either 3σ୔୐୐ > 45° or 3σ୊୐୐ > 1/4ܶor
3σୈ୐୐ > ݀the WIF shall be generated.
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if
the satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked.
Code lock detection is very similar to estimating the
received C/N଴, inferring that the receiver is operating
on or near the correlation peak. Knowledge of code
lock is obviously parallel to the knowledge of received
signal power. The receiver’s code-correlation process
has to raise the signal out of the noise. The spread
spectrum processing gain (G୮) is defined as the ratio of
the spread bandwidth to the unspread (baseband)
bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation
signal-to-noise ratio can be calculated by [12]:(S/N)୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = (S/N)୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ (8)
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted
code, the signal power at the band pass output is
crushed into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The
processing gain can be calculated from:G୔ = 10 logቀଶ஼ೃ்ವ ቁ(dB) (9)
where CR is the chipping rate and TD is the data period.
For the C/A-code this works out to be about 43 dB. The
TORNADO-IDS receiver has a cut off value at 10 dB,
which means that if the value is less than this the
satellite signal level is too low to be used in the
positioning computations [11]. Therefore, an additional
threshold to be accounted for is:S/N୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = S/N୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ ³ 10 dB (10)
During experimental flight test activities performed
with unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was
also found that, in a variety of dynamics conditions, aC/N଴ of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking of the
satellites [12]. Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for
the CIF, the following additional criteria are adopted for
the TORNADO S/N integrity flags:
 When the C/N଴ is less than 27dB-Hz or the
difference between the S/N and the processing gain
is less than 12 dB, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the C/N଴ is less than 25dB-Hz or the
difference between the S/N and the processing gain
is less than 10 dB, the WIF shall be generated.
2.2 ABIA Flight Path Optimisation Module
Optimising a trajectory for integrity based navigation is
a standard optimisation problem that can be solve like
all optimal control problem using a variety of direct or
indirect derived methods. The optimisation problem is
depicted in Fig. 4
Fig. .
Fig. 4. Trajectory optimization problem.
All the standard components of an optimization
problem are used. A flight dynamic model of the
aircraft gives the dynamic constraints and allows
creating a trajectory that will be flyable by the aircraft.
The integrity degradations and the current GNSS
parameters define a certain number of path constraints.
They ensure that integrity degradations will be avoided
on the whole trajectory. Then boundary conditions
include minimal, maximal, initial and final values for
the entire state and command variable. They are given
by the aircraft sensors, which relate the current flight
parameters, and by the FMS, which gives the
information from the flight plan. The cost function is
the performance criterion to minimize. All the necessary
constraint for the integrity degradations are already
included in the path constraint, therefore the time is
minimized. This choice is made for simplicity and
because only the integrity navigation optimization is
considered in this research, but more complex criterion
could be set based on aircraft performances.
2.2.1 Dynamics Model
The aircraft dynamics model used is a three dimensional
symmetric flight, unsteady model. A 3-Degree of
Freedom (3-DoF) model with variable mass is adopted.
The full set of motion equations is:
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where:m = Aircraft mass;V = Aerodynamic speed;T = Thrust magnitude;
α = Angle of attack;
h = Altitude;L = Lift magnitude;D = Drag;g = Gravity acceleration;
γ = Flight path angle (FPA);
ϕ = Bank or roll angle;
ψ = Heading angle;sୱ୤ୡ = Specific fuel consumption;
Φ  =  Geodetic latitude; 
θ  =  Geodetic longitude; r୑ = Meridional radius of curvature;r୘ = Transverse radius of curvature.
Additionally aerodynamic and propulsion parameters
are calculated separately. Lift and drag are computed
using standard formula.L = ଵ
ଶ
ρVଶC୐S (18)D = ଵ
ଶ
ρVଶCୈS (19)
where:C୐ = Lift coefficient;Cୈ = Drag coefficient;
S = Reference area;
ρ = Air density.
The lift and drag coefficient are calculated from:C୐ = C୐଴ + C୐஑α (20)Cୈ = Cୈ଴ + (େైିେైౣ ీ )మୗ஠୓ୠమ (21)
where:C୐଴ = Lift coefficient at zero angle-of attack;C୐஑ = First order alpha derivative;Cୈ଴ = Minimum drag coefficient;C୐୫ ୈ = Lift Coefficient at minimum drag;O = Oswald’s coefficient;b = Wing span.
2.2.2 Path Constraints
The majority of the GNSS integrity degradations
depend on the relative position of the GNSS receiver
antenna and each satellite. The relative movement
between the GNSS receiver antenna and the satellite is
also crucial. Therefore degradations related to one
satellite do not affect the system with the same manner
or intensity as the others. A loss of integrity occurs if a
combination of several degradations from different
satellites takes place at the same instance. The CIF/WIF
thresholds defined for the antenna obscuration, Doppler
shift, multipath, carrier, interference and satellite
geometry degradations are precisely capable of
detecting combination of such degradations. A potential
CIF or WIF is produced based on the current values of
the aircraft flight parameters (position, Euler angles,
and velocity), the satellite parameters (position and
velocity), and the given thresholds [2]. An individual
CIF or WIF is produced with respect to each satellite of
the constellation. An overall CIF is triggered if there are
less than 5 satellites remaining without an individual
CIF and an overall WIF is triggered if less than 4
satellites are remaining without an individual WIF. In
order to constrain the trajectory optimization process,
dynamic constraint criteria are adopted. An analysis of
the different type of degradations results in inferring
that a common criterion based on satellite elevation
variation in the body frame can be adopted.
2.2.3 Boundary Conditions
The minimum and maximum values for each state and
control variable define the interval allowed during the
optimization process. The range has a direct impact on
the duration and the result of the simulation. The
boundary values are determined based on four main
sources including:
 Current Flight Parameters (CFP) that define the
initial conditions when the optimization process is
started at the WIF generation time step.
 Flight Plan (FP), which defines the final conditions
of the optimization problem, which are essential to
determine the Trajectory Change Point (TCP) where
the UAV can re-join with the initially planned
trajectory.
 Aircraft performance, which dictate the minimum
and maximum values for the state and control
variables.
 Current satellite data that provide the boundary for
the path constraint.
2.2.3 Mathematical Criterion
The elevation and azimuth angles in body frame (blue)
are depicted in Fig. 5.Error! Reference source not
found.
Fig. 5. Elevation and azimuth in body frame.
where:Pୗ = Satellite position;
Pୗଡ଼ଢ଼ = Satellite position in XY frame;R = Line of sight vector;E = Elevation angle;Az = Azimuth angle.
The direction of rotation of the elevation and azimuth
angle are given by the right-hand rule. Considering top
view of the UAV, when the elevation angle increases in
the positive direction (going up), the azimuth is rotating
in a clockwise direction. The elevation angle in the
body frame is computed using the simple trigonometry
relation given by: E = sinିଵቀୖ౰
‖ୖ‖
ቁ (22)
where R୸ is the Z-axis component of the line of sight
vector. In order to use as a dynamic constraint for
trajectory optimisation, the elevation angles are
associated with Euler angles by converting the Line-of-
Sight (LOS) vector from the East-North-Up (ENU)
reference frame to the body frame. The position of the
UAV and satellite is given in the ENU frame, so the
LOS vector is computed using:R = Pୗ− Pୖ (23)
where Pୖ is the receiver position.
The flight path optimisation algorithm is initiated when
degradation in integrity is predicted or detected by the
IFG. The elevation and azimuth are always considered
in the body frame and Az ∈ [−180°; 180°] . The
successive steps involved are:
 Step 1: The satellites in view that remain without an
individual integrity flag are selected and their data
are extracted (position, elevation, azimuth and other
information).
 Step 2: For each selected satellite, the type of flag is
analysed:
- If the flag is not due to Doppler shift, the
minimum elevation limit is set with the current
selected satellite’s elevation angle.
- If the flag is due to Doppler shift, the sign of
the azimuth angle is compared to the sign of
the bank angle. This means that if the satellite
is located in the same direction of the track, the
minimum elevation limit is set with the current
satellite’s elevation value. But if the satellite is
located in the opposite direction of the track,
the maximum elevation limit is set with the
current satellite’s elevation value.
 Step 3: After the satellite elevation limits are set, the
parameters are used in the trajectory optimization
suite.
3. SENSE-AND-AVOID SYSTEM
Both cooperative and non-cooperative SAA systems are
being developed to address UAS safe integration into
the non-segregated airspace [13]. The SAA capability
can be defined as the automatic detection of possible
conflicts (i.e., collision threats) by the UAV platform
and the implementation of avoidance manoeuvres to
prevent the identified collision threats. An analysis of
the available SAA candidate technologies and the
associated sensors was presented in [14, 15]. An
approach to the definition of encounter models and their
applications on the SAA strategies is presented in
[16, 17] considering both cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios. As part of our research, the
possible synergies attainable with the adoption of
different detection, tracking and trajectory generation
algorithms were studied. Additionally, the error
propagation from different sources and the impacts of
host and intruders dynamics on the ultimate SAA
solution were investigated [15]. The requirements for
developing an effective SAA system can be derived
from the current regulations applicable for the human
pilot see-and-avoid capability. Table 1 summarises the
SAA range and Field-of-Regard (FOR) requirements
[13, 16, 18, 19].
Table 1. SAA range and FOR requirements.
Detection range requirements (NM)
Altitude
Manned UAS
Nominal
pilot
Autono-
mous
Line-of-
sight
Beyond
line-of-
sight
Low 2.6 1.1 1.8 1.9
Medium 4.2 1.8 2.9 3.1
High 5.7 2.8 4.1 4.3
FOR requirements (º)
Azimuth ±110
Elevation ±15
The system detection range and FOR have to be
adequate to ensure separation from the intruder to
prevent a probable near mid-air collision. This criterion
is also naturally applicable in the case of small UA
since the vast majority of mid-air collision events occur
below 3000 ft [16]. The key criteria for designing an
effective SAA system are:
 The Field of View (FOV) has to be equivalent or
superior to that of a pilot in the cockpit and it
corresponds to primary FOV - 60˚ in vertical and 
70˚ in horizontal and secondary FOV - 100˚ in 
vertical and 120˚ in horizontal [20]. 
 Common FOV/FOR for visual and thermal cameras.
 Accurate and precise intruder detection, recognition
and trajectory prediction.
 Prior obstacle detection for allowing time for
executing the trajectory avoidance manoeuvres.
 Effective fusion schemes for multi-sensor data
augmentation, especially by tight coupling [21].
 Identification of the primary means of cooperative
and non-cooperative SAA system for integrity
requirements.
A number of cooperative and non-cooperative
sensors/systems have been studied recently.
Cooperative systems typically include TCAS (Traffic
Collision Avoidance System) / ACAS (Airborne
Collision Avoidance System) and Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). The inclusion of
ADS-B in association with GNSS-based navigation
systems redefines the paradigm of C-SAA in the
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS)
Air Traffic Management (ATM) context by allowing
the share of accurate GNSS trajectory information. The
non-cooperative SAA sensors are employed to detect
intruders or other obstacles in the UA FOR when
cooperative systems are unavailable in the intruders
[22]. Optical, thermal, LIDAR, MMW Radar and
acoustic sensors can be used as part of non-cooperative
SAA architecture. As an example, the combined SAA
architecture proposed in [15] is depicted in Fig. 6 with
an identification of primary (solid line) and auxiliary
sensors (dashed line) for cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA tasks.
Fig. 6. SAA system architecture. Adapted from [15].
The sequential steps involved in the SAA process for
executing an efficient Tracking, Deciding and Avoiding
(TDA) loop are illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. SAA system process.
Criticality analysis is carried out to prioritize (i.e. to
determine if a collision risk threshold is exceeded for all
the tracked intruders) and to determine the action
commands. If an avoidance action is required, the SAA
system generates and optimises an avoidance trajectory
according to a cost function defined by {minimum
distance, fuel, time and closure rate} with the aid of
differential geometry algorithms [16] to generate a
smooth trajectory.
3.1 Non-Cooperative sensors
Gimballed visual and thermal cameras are used for
determining position and velocity estimates of the
intruders. To obtain all-weather operation, thermal
imaging can be used in conjunction with the visual
sensor. The proposed hardware for the camera provides
an approximate FOV of 70º with a resolution of 2.0 MP.
The fusion of optical sensors with other non-
cooperatives sensors increases the angular accuracy.
LIDAR sensor, scaled from [23], is proposed for
extracting range measurements and provides a FOV of
40º in azimuth and 15º in elevation. It allows the
operator to select the azimuth orientation of the FOV
among three possible directions: aligned with the
platform heading (normal flight envelope) or 20º
left/right with respect the platform heading. This option
provides an optimized coverage for turning manoeuvres
at high angular speed. For stabilised obstacle detection,
after image acquisition, the noise caused by the
platform motion is removed. Bottom-hat morphology is
performed to detect negative contrast features that
correspond to the threats. Low-level tracking is
achieved by utilising Ad-hoc Viterbi filtering method
by employing a bank of filters. Let α୬ୠ(i, j) be the filter
output at time step, n of pixel (i, j) for the filter bank
branch b , and I୬(i, j) be the greyscale level of pixel(i, j), the Ad-hoc Viterbi filter steps, for 1 ≤ i ≤ H, 1 ≤
j ≤ W and all n , are carried out. The statistical test
criterion for evaluation to determine the actual presence
of a collision threat is given by:
γ୬ = maxଵஸ୧ஸୌ ,ଵஸ୨ஸ୛ [α୬(i, j)] (24)
where γ୬ is the comparison parameter and is equivalent
to 0.75 [14]. A multi-sensor navigation and guidance
system is adopted for position estimates, which includes
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Micro-
Electromechanical System (MEMS) Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) and Vision Based Navigation
(VBN) sensors [24, 25]. When the set threshold is
exceeded and the detection is continuous, high level
tracking detection is performed by using a Kalman
filter. The predicted state, xෝ(t) at time t is given by:
xෝ(t) =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
P୶(t)P୷(t)V୶(t)V୷(t)⎦⎥⎥
⎤ = ቎1 0 1 00 1 0 10 0 1 00 0 0 1቏⎣⎢⎢
⎡
P୶(t − 1)P୷(t − 1)V୶(t − 1)V୷(t − 1)⎦⎥⎥
⎤
(25)
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⎢
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⎢
⎡
tଶ2 00 tଶ2t 00 t ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
ቂ
a୶a୷ቃ+ ε(t)
where P୶,୷(t) is the position in the x and y directions
respectively as a function of time, t. V୶,୷(t) is the
velocity in the x and y direction respectively, a୶,୷(t) is
the acceleration and ε(t) is the prediction Gaussian
noise. The Kalman filter equations adopted are:xො୧(k|k) = xො୧(k|k − 1) + W୧(k)[z୧(k)−H୧(k)x୧(k|k − 1)](26)P୧(k|k) = P୧(k|k − 1) −W୧(k)S୧(k)W୧୘(k) (27)
where: W୧(k) = P୧(k|k − 1)H୧୘(k)S୧ିଵ(k) (28)S୧(k) = Hൣ୧(k)P୧(k|k − 1)H୧୘(k) + R୧(k)൧ (29)
where H୧(k) represents the design matrix and R୧(k) is
the measurement noise covariance matrix and k is the
sample time. The Track-To-Track (T3) algorithm is
employed for sensor fusion. The primary advantage of
adopting this method is to combine the estimates instead
of combining the observations from different sensors.
The track fusion algorithm is defined as the weighted
average variance of all the tracks and is given by:xො୊(k|k) = P୊(k|k) × ∑ P୧ିଵ(k|k) xො୧୬୧ୀଵ (k|k) (30)P୊(k|k) = [∑ P୧ିଵ(k|k)୬୧ୀଵ ]ିଵ (31)
Once the tracks are fused and the states are estimated,
the imminent trajectory is predicted. The errors in
predicted trajectory can be derived from the quality of
the measurements, reflected in the prediction error,
which are expressed as:
σଶ (k + τ|k) = var[n(k + τ) − nො୪(k + τ|k)] (32)
where n(k + τ) is the exhibited (modelled) trajectory
and nො୪(k + τ|k) is the predicted optimal trajectory at
sample time k + τ . For trajectory prediction, the
obstacle centre of mass, the target orientation and the
geometric shape of the uncertainty volume are
determined. Once the trajectory is predicted, the Risk of
Collision (ROC) is determined by calculating the
probability of a near mid-air event for the predicted
trajectory over the time horizon by employing Monte
Carlo approximations.
3.2 Cooperative systems
Using ADS-B, the future position of the intruder is
projected based on the current state vector. The ADS-B
measurement model adopted for position and velocity
estimates in x and y cardinal directions is given as:
Z(k) = ቎1 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 0 00 0 0 0 1 0቏
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
xẋẍyẏÿ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤ +
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
V୶(k)V୶ሶ(k)V୷(k)V୷ሶ(k)⎦⎥⎥
⎤
(33)
Assuming the velocity components, V୶(k), V୶ሶ(k), V୷(k)
and V୷ሶ(k) as being affected only by Gaussian noise
with zero mean, the standard deviation is defined by the
covariance matrix given by:
R =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
E[V୶ଶ] 0 0 00 E[V୶ሶଶ] 0 00 0 E[V୷ଶ] 00 0 0 E[V୷ሶଶ]⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
(34)
where E[ ] represents the mean. An Interacting Multiple
Model (IMM) algorithm is adopted for data fusion. The
IMM model is a state-of-the-art tracking algorithm
when multiple kinematics behaviour is to be considered.
Using this model, the state vector of the intruders is
determined and this is propagated to predict the future
trajectories using a probabilistic model. After
computing the mixing probability, the combination of
the state estimate is given by:xො୊(k|k) = ∑ xො୨(k|k)୰୧ୀ୨ μ୨(k) (35)
where μ୨(k) is the mode probability update. For conflict
detection, the resultant covariance matrix, Q after
transformation is defined as:Q = R ∗ S ∗ R୘ (36)
where S is the diagonal covariance matrix and R
represents the transformation matrix between the
heading aligned frame to that of the UA host platform
frame. The probability of conflict is defined as the
volume below the surface of the probability density
function, p(x, y) representing the conflict zone. The
conflict probability, Pୡ is expressed as:Pୡ = ∫ ∫ p(x, y)ାஶିஶି∆୷ା∆୷ୡି∆୷ି∆୷ୡ dx dy (37)
where ∆y + ∆yc represents the conflict separation
distance and ∆xc, ∆yc correspond to the rows of the
conflict boundary matrix. The conflict probability is
simplified as:Pୡ = P(−∆y + ∆yc) - P(−∆y + ∆yc) (38)
3.3 Uncertainty Volume
Error analysis is performed to determine the overall
uncertainty volume in the airspace surrounding the
intruder tracks. This is accomplished by considering
both the navigation and the tracking errors affecting the
measurements and translating them to unified range and
bearing uncertainty descriptors. In order to quantify the
errors, let σ୉୶ , σ୉୷ and σ୉୸ represent the standard
deviation of the navigation error (σ୬୶, σ୬୷, σ୬୸) or the
tracking error (σ୲୶, σ୲୷, σ୲୸) in the x, y and z cardinal
directions respectively. Using a spherical coordinates
frame with origin at the host UA centre of mass, the
range and bearing errors associated with the intruder
tracking process is transformed into a local Cartesian
coordinate frame (either host or intruder body frame).
The error ellipsoid is defined as [15]:
୶మ
஢ు౮
మ + ୷మ஢ు౯మ + ୸మ஢ు౰మ = 1 (39)
With respect to the obtained navigation and tracking
error ellipsoids, spherical hormonics coefficients are
determined. Let r(θ, ψ) represent the smooth function
defined on the ellipsoid and the parameterisation is
given by: r(θ, ψ) = ∑ ∑ X୪୫୪୫ ୀି୪ஶ୪ୀ଴ Y୪୫ (θ, ψ) (40)
The function r(θ, ψ) is limited to a number of N finite
coefficients. X୪୫ is a factor and the function Y୪୫ (θ, ψ)
is the spherical hormonic function and is given by:
Y୪୫ (θ, ψ) = ට (ଶ୪ାଵ)(୪ି ୫ )!ସ஠(୪ା୫ )! P୪୫ cos(θ) e୧୫ ந (41)
where P୪୫ represents the Legendre functions.
Expanding e୧୫ ந as C୪୫ cos(mψ) + i S୪୫ cos(mψ) , we
have C୪୫ and S୪୫ defined as the spherical hormonic
coefficients. The spherical hormonic coefficients are
obtained as [26]: S୪୫ = 0; l, m ε N (42)C୪୫ = 0; l, m ε 2N + 1 (43)
and for all other l, m:
C୪୫ = ଷୟౢ ቀౢమቁ!ቀౢౣ ቁ!(ଶିஔ౥ౣ )ଶౣ (୪ାଷ)(୪ାଵ)! × (44)
෍
(aଶ− bଶ)(୫ ାସ୧)/ଶ[cଶ− ቀ12ቁ(aଶ− bଶ)](୪ି ୫ ିସ୧)/ଶ16୧ቀl − m − 4i2 ቁ!ቀm + 2i2ቁ! i!
(୪ି ୫ )/ସ
୧ୀ଴
where δ୭୫ is the Kronecker symbol and (a, b, c)
represents the semi-major radius of the navigation or
tracking error ellipsoid. Both navigation and tracking
error ellipsoids are generated and the overall uncertainty
volume is obtained by combining the two error
ellipsoids. A notional example of the resulting
uncertainty volume for uncorrelated measurements
(obtained by inflating the navigation ellipsoid with the
tracking error components) is illustrated in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. Uncertainty volume.
5. ABIA/SAA SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
The ABIA/SAA integrated architecture is illustrated in
Fig. 9. The Position, Velocity and Attitude (PVA)
measurements are obtained from an Extended Kalman
Filter (EKF) that fuses data from GNSS and other
navigation sensors [27]. An initial flight path is
generated using the aircraft dynamics model. The IFG
module run is performed on that trajectory. Based on
the availability of cooperative systems (C-SAA) and the
check of the threshold for C-SAA, the C-SAA systems
or non-cooperative SAA (N-SAA) sensors are used for
granting safe separation. CIF is generated id a safe
separation cannot be obtained. In the event of achieving
safe separation, the WIF is generated based on the
prediction of a conflict. The flight path optimization
process starts when the first CIF is generated. Pseudo-
Spectral Optimisation (PSO) and Differential Geometry
Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate a
new optimised trajectory free of any integrity
degradations. The DGO techniques algorithms are
defined considering the UAV and the intruder as points
that move in a curved trajectory. Frenet-Serret equations
of the UAV are defined in order to express its relative
motion [16]. Subsequently, a minimum separation
distance is defined. If the distance between the UAV
and the moving intruder is or will be less than the
separation distance at a specific time interval, then a
conflict condition is established. Time is used as cost
functional, the dynamic model as dynamic constraint,
and elevation criteria as path constraints. Boundary
conditions are set from the value of the flight
parameters at CIF time step. An alternate trajectory free
of integrity degradation is then generated. This
trajectory is run again through the IFG for validation.
The selection of the optimal trajectory from the
generated set of safe trajectories is performed, which is
then fed to the aircraft guidance subsystems. The
implemented decision logic is based on minimisation of
the following cost function [28, 29]:
ܬ= ݓ௧ ∙ tௌ஺ிா + ݓ௙න [ ܵܨܥ ∙ ܶ(ݐ)]݀ݐ− wௗ ∙ ܦ௠ ௜௡ +
−ݓ௜ௗ ∙ ∫ܦ(ݐ)݀ݐ (45)
where:
 D(t) is the estimated distance of the generated
avoidance trajectory points from the avoidance
volume associated with the obstacle.
 D୫ ୧୬ = min[D(t)] is the estimated minimum
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the
avoidance volume.
 tୗ୅୊୉ = t|ୈౣ ౟౤ is the time at which the safe
avoidance condition is successfully attained.
 SFC [୩୥
୒
∙ s] is the specific fuel consumption.
 T(t) is the thrust profile.
 w୲ , w୤, wୢ, w୧ୢ are the weightings attributed to time,
fuel, distance and integral distance respectively.
In time-critical avoidance applications (i.e., closing-up
obstacles with high relative velocities) appropriate
higher weightings are used for the time and distance
cost elements.
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Fig. 9. ABIA/SAA integrated architecture.
6. SIMULATION
A number of simulation case studies were performed to
evaluate the performance of the ABIA/SAA integrated
architecture. A GNSS constellation simulator was
implemented to support GNSS satellite visibility, signal
and geometry analysis. Using CATIA-P3, a detailed
aircraft 3-Dimensional Model (3DM) was developed
and an Aircraft Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was
implemented to generate the nominal flight path
trajectory and Euler angles. Terrain and Objects Data
(TOD) was used to run the MPS and using a DTED, it a
detailed map of the terrain beneath the aircraft was
obtained. Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from
the ADS module, terrain elevation data were
automatically extracted and fed to the TOM module
where they are integrated with the database of man-
made objects (e.g., buildings). The Doppler Simulator
Module (DSM) was used to calculate the Doppler shift
by processing ADS and GCS inputs. The Multipath
Analysis Module (MAM) processed the 3DM, TEM,
GCS and ADS inputs to determine multipath
contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) and
from the terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The
Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM), and was used to
compute the GNSS antenna(e) masking matrixes for all
aircraft manoeuvres with inputs from the 3DM, GCS
and ADS. The nominal link budget of the direct GNSS
signals received by the aircraft in the presence of
ionospheric and tropospheric propagation disturbances
was evaluated using SAM. The Integrity Flags
Simulator (IFS) used a set of predefined threshold
parameters to trigger the generation of both caution and
warning flags associated with antenna obscuration,
Doppler shift, multipath, SNR and satellite geometry
degradations.
6.1 GNSS Constellation Simulator
The GNSS constellation simulator (GCS) was
developed to calculate GNSS satellite position and
velocity in the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
reference frame and to obtain satellite visibility data
from any point along the aircraft flight trajectory. The
initial version of the GCS was implemented in
MATLAB® to simulate GPS and GALILEO
constellations. However, the GCS was developed as a
flexible tool capable to incorporate other current and
likely future GNSS constellations (GLONASS,
COMPASS, IRNSS, QZSS, etc.), including space-based
regional and global augmentation systems. The satellite
position and velocity are calculated from the Kepler's
laws of orbital motion using either the YUMA or SEM
almanac data [30, 31].
6.2 Aircraft 3-D Model
Various geometric parameters were extracted from the
literature to draw a detailed CATIA model of the
AEROSONDE UAV [32, 33, 34]. The AEROSONDE
3-D CATIA model obtained is illustrated in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. AEROSONDE 3-D CATIA model.
To calculate the antenna masking matrix and the
corresponding satellite visibility conditions, the antenna
location were included in the model. The location of
the AEROSONDE GPS antenna extracted from the
literature is shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11. AEROSONDE antennae locations. Adapted from [35, 36].
The antenna-satellite LOS is measured in the antenna
frame (i.e., origin at the antenna focal point) and the
transformation from body-frame to antenna frame is
obtained from:Fୟ୬୲ୣ ୬୬ୟ = Fୠ୭ୢ୷ + Tୠ୭ୢ୷ୟ୬୲ୣ ୬୬ୟ (m) (46)
For the AEROSONDE UAV, the single antenna
transformation matrix is:
Tୠ୭ୢ୷ୟ୬୲ୣ ୬୬ୟ ൌ ൥0.341.690.43൩ሺሻ (47)
6.3 Satellite Masking Analysis
Due to the manoeuvres of the UAV, the wings, tail and
fuselage will obscure some satellites during the flight.
Fig. 12 shows the structure of the Satellite Masking
Analysis (SMA) module.
Fig. 12. GNSS satellite obscuration simulator.
Taking into account the aircraft shape (CATIA 3-D
model), the aircraft flight dynamics and the information
provided by the GCS, an Antenna Masking Matrix
(AMM) is generated for the different flight phases. To
automate the process of AMM generation, Automatic
Masking Profile Computation (AMPC) software was
developed. The AMPC software populates a database
(look up tables) containing the obscuration information
of GNSS satellite signals for different aircraft roll and
pitch angles. This is accomplished by implementing two
different modules in the AMPC: the first is used to
transform the aircrafts CAD model in a mesh of small
triangular surfaces that allows straightforward
computations of line/surface intersections in a
MATLAB® environment; the second is used to rotate
the aircraft in pitch and roll (bank), and to calculate the
intersections between the aircraft structure (i.e.,
fuselage, wings and tail) and the line-of-sight (LOS) to
all satellites in view as illustrated in Fig. 13.
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Fig. 13. AMPC logic diagram.
After creating the 3-D aircraft surface model, the
corresponding CAD file was transformed in a
Stereolithography (STL) file format. An STL file is
a convenient representation of a complex 3D surface
geometry, made by a number of oriented triangles
(mesh). Each of these triangles is described by two
elements: the first is a unit normal vector to the facet;
the second element is a set of three points listed in
counter clockwise order representing the vertices of the
triangle. This representation is ideally suited for the
ABIA simulation environment. As an example, the
AEROSONDE mesh imported and plotted in
MATLAB® is illustrated in Fig. 14.
Fig. 14. AEROSONDE mesh in MATLAB®.
Using this representation, the AMMs in pitch and roll
are generated calculating all possible intersections of
the aircraft body (all triangular surfaces) with the LOS
antenna-satellites (Fig. 15).
Fig. 15. AEROSONDE masking profile simulation.
In order to generate CIF/WIF associated to critical UAV
antenna masking conditions, a dedicated analysis is
required taking into account the simultaneous variation
of pitch and bank. An example of the resulting Global
Masking Envelope (GME) taking into account both
bank (B) and pitch (P) angle variations is shown in Fig.
16.
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Fig. 16. Global masking envelope.
Besides the GME, other factors influence the satellite
visibility. In general, a satellite is geometrically visible
to the GNSS receiver only if its elevation in the antenna
frame is above the Earth horizon and the antenna
elevation mask. It should be noted that even high
performance avionics GNSS antennas have a gain
patterns that is typically below -3dB at about 5 degrees
elevation [37] and, as a consequence, their performance
become marginal below this limit. In order to
determine if a satellite is obscured, the LOS of the
satellite with respect to the antenna phase centre has to
be determined. To calculate the satellite azimuth and
elevation with respect to the antenna the transformation
matrix between ECEF (Earth Centred Earth Fixed) and
the antenna frame must be applied. This transformation
is obtained as follows:T୉ୟ = Tୠୟ ∗ T୒ୠ ∗ T୉୒ (48)
where Tୠୟ is the transformation matrix between the
aircraft body frame and the antenna frame, T୒ୠ is the
transformation matrix from ENU (East-North-Up) to
body frame, and T୉୒ is the ECEF to ENU transformation
matrix.
6.4 IFG Simulation
In order to validate the design of the ABIA IFG module,
a MATLAB® simulation activity was performed
employing the algorithms developed during this
research. The simulated AEROSONDE UAV trajectory
included the following flight phases:
 Climb phase (0-300s);
 Turning climb phase (300-600s);
 Straight and level (cruise) phase (600-900s);
 Level turn phase (900-1200s)
 Turn and descend phase (1200-1500s);
 Descend (straight approach) phase (1500-1800s);
The combined GPS/GALILEO constellation was
simulated and the GNSS receiver tracking loops were
modelled with a flat random vibration power curve from
20Hz to 2000Hz with amplitude of 0.005gଶ/Hz and the
oscillator vibration sensitivity S஥(f୫ ) = 1 × 10ିଽ
parts/g. All CIFs and WIFs relative to antenna masking,
geometric accuracy degradations, SNR, multipath and
Doppler shift were generated. The main results
obtained with the simulated GPS constellation are
shown in Table 2. In some cases, the CIF was
generated but it was not followed by the WIF (this was
due to a temporary adverse relative geometry not
leading to GNSS signal losses). During the level turn
and turning descent phases, the CIF was followed by the
WIF. It was also observed that the CIF was always
triggered at least 2 seconds before the successive WIF
onset (up to 13 seconds in one case during the turning
descent phase).
These results are consistent with previous ABIA
research on manned aircraft applications [1, 2, 3] and
corroborate the validity of the models developed for the
CIF/WIF thresholds. It is evident that the availability of
a usable CIF represents a significant progress in this
research with the potential for both manned aircraft and
UAVs to recover from mission- and safety-critical flight
conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses.
Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly designed
ABIA FPM could take full advantage of this predictive
behaviour, allowing the UAV to correct its flight
trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the occurrence of
the critical GNSS data losses. Additionally, it is
possible that this predictive behaviour be exploited in
the pursuit of a GNSS based auto-landing capability.
Table. 2. GPS constellation simulation results.
CIF WIF
Climb --- ---
Turning
Climb
334~374s,
426~446s
517~558s
---
Cruise 874~900s ---
Level
Turn 901~1200s
903~906s, 913s, 920~924s,
930~931s, 938~942 s, 948~949s,
956~959s, 966~967s, 974~977s,
984~985s, 992~995s, 1002~1003s,
1110~1113s,
1020~1021s, 1028~1031s,
1128~1129s, 1136~1139s,
1146~1147s, 1154~1157s,
1164~1165s, 1172~1175s,
1182~1183s, 1190~1192s, 1200s
Turning
Descent
1201~1441s,
1448~1464s,
1471~1487s
1494~1500s
1204s, 1223~1224s, 1247~1249s,
1272~1273s, 1296~1297s,
1320~1321s, 1344~1367s, 1368s,
1391~1392s, 1414~1415s,
1438~1439s, 1461~1462s,
1484~1485s
Descent 1503~1800s ---
These results contribute to corroborate the validity of
the models developed for the CIF/WIF thresholds. It
was also observed that the CIF was always triggered at
least 2 seconds before the successive WIF onset. This
evidence is particularly important for the ABIA system
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design. In fact, it is evident that the availability of a
usable CIF represents a significant progress in this
research with the potential for both manned aircraft and
UAVs to recover from mission- and safety-critical flight
conditions potentially leading to GNSS data losses.
Therefore, it is envisaged that a properly designed
ABIA FPM could take full advantage of this predictive
behaviour, allowing the UAV to correct its flight
trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the occurrence of
the critical GNSS data losses. Additionally, it is
possible that this predictive behaviour be exploited in
the pursuit of a GNSS based auto-landing capability.
6.5 IFG/FPM Simulation
Simulation activities were also carried out to validate
the IFG/FPM integration. An initial trajectory was used
as a reference and was obtained by using the
AEROSONDE 3-DOF dynamics model. The resultant
scenario is depicted in Fig. 17Fig.
Fig. 17. Simulation scenario.
The trajectory is a turning descent path with a constant
pitch angle of -5° of pitch, a constant bank angle of -
40°, and a constant throttle of 2000 RPM. All the state
and command variables for the entire path are plotted in
Appendix A. A first predictive caution is generated,
then at the next time step of the degradation analysis
another predictive caution signal is generated, because
the thresholds for integrity degradations are still not
exceed. Finally at the second analysis point after the
first caution signal the integrity degradation happens
and is detected. A new trajectory that avoids GNSS
degradation can be optimized starting when the first
predictive caution is generated. Pseudospectral
optimization was used to solve the optimization
problem. The resulting trajectory, also tested with the
same integrity degradation detection model, is shown in
Fig. 18
Fig.
Fig. 18. Optimised trajectory without any integrity degradations.
To avoid degradations and at the same time to satisfy
the path constraints with the conditions set on satellite
elevation angle, the optimised trajectory was obtained
by decoupling the pitch and the bank angles. It was
observed that pitch down and turn left commends were
performed. The effect on the satellite elevation angle in
the body frame is illustrated in Fig. 19 and 20. It was
observed that before optimisation, the elevation drops
significantly after the first integrity degradation
prediction (represented as dots in Fig. 19), which leads
to an integrity loss. After optimisation, it was observed
that the elevation angle is high enough to prevent the
occurrence of the loss of integrity.
Fig. 19. Elevation of the satellites before optimisation.
Fig. 20.Elevation of the satellites after optimisation.
6.6 ABIA/SAA Simulation
The ABIA integration into an existing UAV SAA
architecture was studied in cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA scenarios. The test platforms used
were 3DoF aircraft dynamics models:
 AEROSONDE UAV (ABIA host platform) ans
 AIRBUS 320 (A320) and AEROSONDE UAV
intruders.
In all the scenarios, an avoidance volume (sum of
navigation and tracking errors) was generated by the
SAA system [15]. Pseudospectral (PSO) or constrained
differential geometric optimization (DGO) techniques
were used to generate the new trajectory based on the
available time to conflict (host entering the avoidance
volume). The avoidance trajectory was initiated by the
SAA system when the probability of collision exceeded
the required threshold value. Time and fuel were used in
the cost functional, the dynamic model as dynamic
constraint, and the elevation criteria as path constraints
for both PSO and DGO techniques. Boundary
conditions were set from the value of the flight
parameters at CIF time step. A collision avoidance
trajectory free of GNSS integrity degradation was
generated. Fig. 21 illustrates the cooperative SAA test
scenario wherein two AEROSONDE (1 ABIA host
platform and 1 intruder) UAV are 90 off track at the
same Flight Level (FL). The collision is detected and
resolved and as a result the host and intruder UAVs
avoid colliding in mid-air. The host UAV platform
equipped with ABIA/SAA is able to generate an
avoidance trajectory without any CIF/WIF occurrences.
As can be seen from Fig. 21, the host UAV SAA only
avoidance trajectory and ABIA/SAA avoidance
trajectory have a different re-join point on the original
track.
Conflict Resolution
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 21. 2 UAV 90º collision cooperative SAA scenario.
Three different points are shown on the ABIA/SAA
host platform trajectory in Fig. 22:
 SAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point
where the host UA initiates the avoidance trajectory
(commanded by the SAA system). The cost function
criteria adopted in this case is minimum time.
 SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point: Corresponding to
the point where the host UAV can manoeuvre safely
(any manoeuvre within its operational flight
envelope) has 0 ROC. From this point onwards the
SAA cost function criteria switches to minimum
time and minimum fuel to get back on the original
(desired) track.
 ABIA Re-join Point: Corresponding to the point
where the host UAV re-joins the original (desired)
track without GNSS data degradations.
SAA Break-off Point
SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point
GNSS Data Loss – SAA Commanded
Trajectory (without ABIA)
ABIA Re-join Point
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 22. Illustration of reference points.
The horizontal separation and predicted conflict
probability in this case is shown in Fig. 23 and 24
respectively.
Fig. 23. Obtained horizontal separation.
Fig. 24. Predicted conflict probability.
Fig. 25 illustrates the non-cooperative SAA test
scenario wherein AEROSONDE (ABIA host platform)
UAV and an A320 are on the same FL but are 90 off
track to each other.
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 25. UAV 90º collision non-cooperative SAA scenario.
The horizontal and vertical separation obtained is
illustrated in Fig. 26.
Fig. 26. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation.
Fig. 27 illustrates the cooperative SAA test scenario
wherein AEROSONDE (ABIA host platform) UAV and
two intruders (AEROSONDE UAVs) are on the same
FL. One intruder UAV is 90 off track and the other is
on a head-on collision with the host UAV. The
horizontal and vertical separation obtained with respect
to intruder 1 and 2 are illustrated in Fig. 28 and 29
respectively.
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
Fig. 27. 3 UAV collision cooperative SAA scenario.
Fig. 28. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 1.
Fig. 29. Obtained horizontal and vertical separation of intruder 2.
The simulation results demonstrate that the ABIA IFG
module is capable of generating integrity flags to
provide both caution and warning signals when GNSS
signals are degraded or lost. After the integrity caution
flag is generated, the time available for the
pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity event is
detected and the warning flag is generated), is at least 2
seconds. This TTC can support safety-critical tasks
including GLS curved/segmented precision approach
and automatic landing applications. Data analysis
showed that the ABIA system can provide useful
integrity signals for CAT-III precision approach and
automatic landing (automated and real-time FPO is
essential in this case). In the C-SAA and N-SAA
scenarios investigated and in the dynamic conditions
explored, all near mid-air collision threats were
successfully avoided by implementing adequate
trajectory optimisation algorithms. Both PSO and DGO
algorithms proved successful in C-SAA and N-SAA
scenarios depending on the available time for the
optimisation loops (distance host-intruders and relative
dynamics).
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this research the synergies between a GNSS Avionics
Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system and a
novel Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Sense-and-
Avoid (SAA) architecture for cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios were explored. The integration of
ABIA with SAA leads to an Integrity Augmented SAA
(IAS) solution allowing safe and unrestricted access of
UAS to commercial airspace. The ABIA and SAA
research activities were presented and a detailed
ABIA/SAA integrated architecture was established.
Simulation case studies were performed for IFG,
IFG/FPM and ABIA/SAA modules. The trajectory
optimization problem was mathematically formulated
and the real-time capability of the FPOM (using
pseudospectral and other methods) was verified. From
the results of the simulation activity, the following
conclusions can be drawn:
 The design of an Avionics Based Integrity
Augmentation (ABIA) system for GNSS
applications was accomplished.
 The ABIA Integrity Flag Generator (IFG) is
capable of generating integrity flag to provide both
caution (predictive) and warning signals to the
pilot when GNSS signals are degraded or lost.
 According to the simulation results, after the
integrity caution flag is generated, the time
available for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the
integrity warning flag is generated), is sufficient
for safety-critical tasks including GLS
curved/segmented precision approach and
automatic landing applications.
 Data analysis shows that the ABIA system can
provide the level of integrity required for CAT-
IIIC precision approach, which are not currently
available with LAAS.
 The ABIA integration into an existing UAV SAA
architecture proved that all near mid-air collision
threats were successfully avoided by implementing
trajectory optimisation algorithms.
 The proposed ABIA/SAA integration architecture
is capable of achieving adequate performance by
avoiding critical satellite signal losses while
fulfilling the separation requirements for SAA set
by international aviation organisations.
Further research is focussing on the following areas:
 Improve the aircraft flight dynamics model and
complete the development of a Manoeuvre
Identification Algorithm (MIA) suitable for
incorporation in the ABIA flight path optimisation
module.
 Examine other types of manned aircraft (e.g., civil
airliners) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
as well as unconventional body shapes (e.g., blended
wings aircraft).
 Perform additional research on multipath detection
and isolation in various kinds of receivers for
avionics applications.
Additional long-term objectives of this research include
the following:
 Investigate and compare different types of avionics
sensor technologies and their potential to support the
design of robust ABAS/ABIA architectures for
manned A/C and UAVs.
 Extend the ABAS/ABIA concepts to the
Aeronautical Data Link (ADL) application domain
and investigate ABIA LOS and BLOS
communications interfaces for UAS applications.
 Investigate ABIA evolution for Next Generation
Flight Management System (NG-FMS) applications
[38-41]:
- Trajectory Optimization for Future CNS+A
Systems.
- 4DT Intent Based Operations.
- NG-FMS/ABIA Integration.
 Study possible applications of the ABAS/ABIA
concepts to advanced mission planning and forensic
(accident investigation) applications.
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance
the performance of next generation CNS/ATM
systems for Performance/Intent Based Operations
(PBO/IBO) and Four-Dimensional Trajectory (4DT)
management.
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